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DIVINE ASEITY, DIVINE FREEDOM:
A CONCEPTUAL PROBLEM FOR EDWARDSIAN-CALVINISM
JAMES BEILBY*

The purpose of this paper is to consider whether the Calvinista typical
understanding of why God created the world is consistent with the assertion
of God's independence and self-sufficiency—an attribute theologians have
labeled "aseity." The essence of the problem is this: the Calvinisms typical
assertion that God's fundamental purpose in creation is to demonstrate his
glory seems to entail that God have an "other" to whom his glory must be
demonstrated. But if this is the case, then God is dependent in some sense
on this "other" for the demonstration of his glory and, ironically, less sovereign than in a theology where the demonstration of God's glory is less central.
While this is not a new objection, it has not been a primary locus of discussion for some time. The reason for this is not that the objection is too obscure
to be recognized, but rather that the objection has apparently been deemed
to be answered.
I will begin by denning the central terms of the dispute: aseity, divine freedom, and Calvinism. Then, after sketching the basic contours of the objection,
I will consider the answer of arguably the greatest American theologian,
Jonathan Edwards, whose treatment of this topic has been enormously
influential. After arguing that Edwards's answer fails, I will close with a
consideration of the various options open to Calviniste with respect to this
objection.
I. THE BASIC ARGUMENT: THE TENSION BETWEEN
CALVINISM AND DIVINE ASEITY

As much as evangelical Christians disagree about how the sovereignty of
God should be understood and what its implications should be, there is universal acceptance that God is independent, self-existent, and fully selfsufficient. He does not need anything outside of himself to exist, be satisfied,
be fulfilled, or (to borrow an overused phrase from contemporary psychology) be "self-actualized." Whether Exodus 3:14 is translated "I am who I
am" or "I will be what I will be," the meaning is the same: God's existence
and character are determined by him alone.1

* James Beilby is assistant professor of theology at Bethel College, 3900 Bethel Drive, St.
Paul, MN 55112.
1
See Wayne Grudem, Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1994) 161.
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These characteristics highlight what has been called God's aseity. Derived from the Latin phrase a se, meaning "from or by himself," aseity is
arguably the most fundamental divine attribute. Herman Bavinck, for example, argues that aseity "is commonly viewed as the first of the attributes"
because it expresses the concept we need "to designate God as God, and to
distinguish him from all that is not God."2 Further, he argues that "all other
attributes were derived from this one,"3 because it is only when one has
accepted that God is a se that we can understand the sense in which all of
the other attributes are ascribed to God.4 If Bavinck is right—and I believe
that he is—our intuitions about, for example, God's sovereignty, immutability,
and infinity do not imply divine aseity. Rather, they flow from a logically prior
understanding of God's aseity.
Whether or not one accepts the primacy of aseity among the divine attributes, it is undeniable that aseity is of crucial importance to an orthodox
understanding of God's nature. Further, it is clear that God's aseity provides
the context in which we understand God's actions and involvement in the
world. The fundamental theological principle entailed by divine aseity is that
while creation is utterly dependent upon God, the dependence is not symmetrical. God's does not depend on creation in any way; there are no needs
or even desires that are fulfilled in the act of creation or in the ensuing relationship with creation.
It would be a mistake, however, to treat aseity as a simple property.
Rather, the property identified as God's aseity certainly encompasses multiple modes of perfection. For the purposes of my paper, I will distinguish
two senses in which God may be said to be a se. First, God is ontologically
a se. He is uncaused, without beginning, not dependent on an external person,
principle, or metaphysical reality for his existence. Second, God is psychologically a se. There is no lack or need in God. He is fully self-satisfied, not
needing anything outside of himself to be happy or fulfilled.
Thus understood, divine aseity requires that God's choice to create the
world be free. But "free" in what sense? While the nature of freedom (human
and divine) is among the most contentious topics in contemporary philosophy and theology, there is agreement that freedom must steer between the
Scylla and Charybdis of causal determinism and indeterminism. What destroys freedom is the lack of self-determination and that results both when
the will is determined by external events or states of affairs and when it has
no cause at all or is indeterminate. In other words, freedom requires not
just the absence of causal determinism, but that the agent be the cause of
the choice.5 God's decision to create, therefore, can be said to be free if it is
self-determined both in the sense of not determined by external factors and
2

Herman Bavinck, Doctrine of God (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1951) 125.
Ibid. 144.
Ibid. 126-27.
5
See the helpful article by Gary Watson, "Free will," in A Companion to Metaphysics (ed. Jaegwon Kim and Ernest Sosa; Blackwell Companions to Philosophy Series; Oxford: Blackwell, 1994)
175-82.
3
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in the sense that it was not completely arbitrary; it was based on good and
sufficient reasons.
So the crucial question is, Why, then, did God create? My argument is that
there exists a tension between God's aseity and the typical Calvinist understanding of God's purpose in creation. Holding the latter seems to suggest
the denial of (or at least a modification of) the former. The rationale for this
conclusion is as follows: If God's purpose in creation is to accomplish a task—
bringing glory to himself—that he both desires and cannot accomplish without creation, it seems that God becomes dependent on creation to accomplish
this task. In such a case, since the orthodox Christian conception of God seems
to require aseity, the typical Calvinist's account of God's purpose in creation
is called into question.
Before I develop this tension, let me be clear about what I am not claiming.
First, there is no tension between aseity and claiming that our purpose in
creation is to give God glory. Consequently, there is no problem in claiming
with the Westminster Larger Catechism: "Man's chief and highest end is to
glorify God, and fully enjoy him forever." Second, there is no tension in God
in fact being glorified (or, more accurately, glorious). Being who he is, God is
intrinsically glorious—his glory is entailed by the holiness, perfection, and
unlimited value of his attributes. Rather, the tension exists between aseity
and the claim that God's purpose in creating was to bring glory to himself.
Finally, I do not claim that there exists any tension between Calvinism and
God's ontological aseity. There is no sense in which God's desire to bring
glory to himself makes him ontologically dependent on the created order.
Rather, the tension arises between Calvinism and psychological aseity.6 Consequently, for the remainder of this paper, unless otherwise specified, the
term "aseity" will be shorthand for "psychological aseity."
For the purpose of having a clear target, let me summarize this argument in the form of modus tollens where C = the Calvinist account of God's
purpose in creation and A = divine aseity:
If C then ~ A
A
Therefore ~ C
Since the minor premise—the affirmation of divine aseity—is uncontroversial, I will direct all of my attention toward exploring the truth of the major
premise and its implications for Calvinism as a whole.
Before doing so, however, I must pause to acknowledge that Calvinism is
not a monolithic theological category. There are infralapsarians and supralapsarians; there are presuppositionalists (of varying stripes) and rationalists; there are Van Tillians, Dooywerdians, Kuyperians, Edwardsians, and a
seemingly infinite number of combinations. An additional problem is that
within Calvinism there are theses (all labeled as Calvinist) that do not
6

I am grateful to Bill Craig and Mike Rea for helpful discussion on this matter.
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mutually entail each other. Abraham Kuyper, for example, saw as central to
Calvinism a worldview the fundamental aspect of which was the impossibility of religious neutrality in any area of scholarship. But it is possible to be
a Calvinist in Kuyper's sense and still be a soteriological Arminian, to reject
many or all of the five points with which Calvinism is often associated. Alvin
Plantinga is a well-known representative of this position. (I am a less wellknown representative of this position.) Finally, while Calvinism is often
associated with the "five points" of Calvinism (derived from the Canons of
Dort), there is no agreement that these and only these points exhaust what
Calvinism is or should be. (There are, in fact, some very good reasons to
think that Reformed theology cannot be limited to these five points.)7
Of course, amid this blooming buzzing confusion there is a common core
to Calvinism—an emphasis on the sovereignty of God above all else. Nevertheless, properly considering the implications of this argument for Calvinism
is something that cannot be done given only the abstract affirmation of the
primacy of God's sovereignty. We need a more concrete target. Consequently,
I will investigate the response of the great American Calvinist, Jonathan
Edwards. I choose Edwards for a number of reasons. First, he has written
much more on this topic than any other Calvinist theologian (in fact, more
than many of them combined!). His magisterial A Dissertation Concerning
the End for Which God Created the World8 is wholly devoted to God's purpose
and freedom in creating the world, and he addresses the issue in a significant number of shorter works.9 Second, his understanding of God's purpose
in creation and his answer to the kind of objection I have sketched has been
enormously influential. It is, perhaps, this fact that explains why there have
not been more objections in the vein of the argument under consideration—
many people think that Edwards has already answered this objection. Finally,
Edwards's response is clear enough to help us see how this argument should
be framed, and (I believe) clear enough to allow us to see why his defense fails.
II. JONATHAN EDWARDS ON DIVINE ASEITY A N D
THE CHIEF END OF CREATION 1 0

In developing his account of God's purpose in creation, Edwards is clearly
aware of the kind of objection I have raised. He begins section four of chap7
A point articulately and forcefully made by Richard A. Müller, "How Many Points?" Calvin
Theological Journal 28 (1993) 425-33.
8
First published (posthumously) in 1765, with a preface by the editor, Samuel Hopkins, a friend
of Edwards. I will refer to this work as "Dissertation" and cite chapter and section. I will also refer
to the page number in John Piper's edition of this work. See his God's Passion for His Glory: Living
the Vision of Jonathan Edwards (With the Complete Text of The End for Which God Created the
World) (Wheaton: Crossway, 1998).
9
Primarily published as "The Miscellanies."
10
Edwards's A Dissertation Concerning the End for Which God Created the World is a rhetorically complex book. There are sections in which Edwards seems to be playing devil's advocate
or throwing out ideas only to debunk them later. The question that arises in Hume's Dialogues—
"Who speaks for Hume?"—can be asked with regard to Edwards as well. Consequently, to avoid
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ter one in his A Dissertation Concerning the End for Which God Created the
World with this statement: "Some may object against what has been said as
being inconsistent with God's absolute independence and immutability."11
From the context, it is clear that "absolute independence" is the same concept I have denned as God's aseity.
The argument that Edwards seems to be addressing can be summarized
as follows: If God's purpose in creation is to bring glory to himself, then there
exists a deficiency in God and this deficiency is addressed by receiving glory
from creation. Edwards's response seems to have the following structure:
while it is God's nature to display his glory, this does not imply that God is
deficient in any respect, because, first, in creation, God's glory is communicated, not received, and second, God communicates his glory in creation not
because of a need, but because of an abundance.
1. Step 1: In creation, God's glory is communicated, not received. Edwards argues that God's creating with the purpose of displaying his glory
does not entail that he needs to receive a response or acknowledgment of his
glory from creation. This is because the glory God receives is not really given
by the creature. He says: "This delight in God can't properly be said to be
received from the creature, because it consists only in a delight in giving to
the creature."12 Edwards uses the analogy of a jewel to explain the sense in
which God's glory is "received" and "given": "The sun receives nothing from
the jewel that receives its light, and shines only by a participation of its
brightness."13
Consequently, according to Edwards, God's purpose in creation is not to
receive glory, but to communicate it. "The pleasure God hath in it [creation]
is rather a pleasure in diffusing and communicating to, than in receiving from,
the creature."14 "Therefore, God doesn't seek his own glory because it makes
him the happier to be honored and highly thought of, but because he loves to
see Himself His own excellencies and glories, appearing in his works—loves
to see himself communicated. And it was his intention to communicate himself that was a prime motive of his creating the world."15 Consequently, if
there is a sense in which God receives glory, it is not from creation but from
within the divine being. Creation is an opportunity for inter-trinitarian
glory, an occasion in which the tri-personal God magnifies himself. "In communicating his fullness for them, he does it for himself.... Their excellency

potential exegetical pitfalls, I will draw most of my material from section four of chapter one. This
section appears to be relatively unencumbered with rhetorical devices because it is a fairly straightforward consideration of a series of objections to his proposal.
11
Edwards, Dissertation, I, 4, objection 1; Piper, God's Passion 162.
12
Edwards, "Miscellanies," n. 679; cf. The Philosophy of Jonathan Edwards (ed. Harvey G.
Townsend. Reprint; Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1972) 138.
13
Edwards, Dissertation, I, 4, objection 1, answer 1; Piper, God's Passion 163.
14
Edwards, Dissertation, I, 4, objection 1, answer 1; Piper, God's Passion 165; italics original.
15
Edwards, "Miscellanies," n. 247, in Townsend, Philosophy 129-30.
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and happiness is nothing, but the emanation and expression of God's glory:
God, in seeking their glory and happiness, seeks himself."16
In summary, the first step of Edwards's argument is that his account of
the purpose of creation does not entail that God created to receive a response
from creation, but to communicate himself to creation. To the degree God's
receives glory, it is received from within the Trinity.
2. Step 2: God communicates his glory not because of a need, but because
of an abundance. Edwards argues that God's creating with his glory as the
chief end does not imply that God is deficient in any way. While the act of
creation is the occasion for the demonstration of his glory, God does not create
out of a lack or deficiency, but with regard to the proper end for humanity.
In John Piper's terms, "If God would do us good, he must direct us to his
worth, not ours."17 Consequently, creation was motivated not by a lack, but
by an abundance: "God infinitely loves himself, yet so is his love that it flows
out to the creature."18 God's motive in creation is, therefore, located in his
abundantly good nature: "God's disposition to cause his own infinite fullness
to flow forth is not the less properly called his goodness because the good he
communicates is what he delights in, as he delights in his own glory....
Nor is this disposition in God to diffuse his own good the less excellent, because it is implied in his love to himself."19 Therefore, in creation, we see
God's desire to "share his over abundance, to permit creatures to enter into
his super-sufficiency."20
III. DOES EDWARDS'S UNDERSTANDING OF GOD'S PURPOSE
IN CREATION UNDERMINE DIVINE ASEITY?

It is beyond question that Edwards's answer has been enormously influential. But does it successfully hold together divine aseity and his understanding of God's purpose in creation? I will argue that it does not. But first, I
may voice a quibble over how Edwards frames the question itself. In defending his account of God's purpose in creation, the only options he considers
for God's chief end of creation are the glory of God and the happiness of his
creatures. Not only are these not the only two options, they are not remotely
contradictory—as Edwards himself ably and repeatedly points out. Consequently, it might be objected that Edward's argument creates a straw man.
Setting that objection aside, recall the two-part objection Edwards is
addressing: (1) there exists a deficiency in God; and (2) this deficiency is
addressed by receiving glory from creation. His defense consists of two propositions: (1) in creation, God's glory is communicated, not received; and
16

Edwards, Dissertation, I, 4, objection 4, answer; Piper, God's Passion 176-77.
Piper, God's Passion 35.
Unpublished MS. sermon on Exodus 33:18-9; cited in John H. Gerstner, The Rational Biblical
Theology of Jonathan Edwards, vol. 2 (Powhatan, VA: Berea; Orlando, FL: Ligonier, 1992) 16 n. 57.
19
Edwards, Dissertation I, 4, objection 4, answer; Piper, God's Passion 178.
20
Gerstner, The Theology of Jonathan Edwards 16.
17
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(2) God communicates his glory in creation not because of a need, but because of an abundance. His responses deal with the objection in reverse
order—the first argues that God's glory is not received, and the second argues that there is no deficiency in God. The problem with Edwards's apologetic is not that these answers are not adequate or defensible, but that their
implications undercut his assertion of God's aseity. I will discuss two such
implications.
1. Implication 1. The first problematic implication of Edwards's apologetic can be identified by asking the question, How does God communicate
his glory in creation? Edwards makes clear that God's glory is found in the
communication of his complete nature—the whole pantheon of his attributes—not just his capacity to create. This is an important fact, because
"there are many of the divine attributes that, if God had not created the
world, never would have had any exercise—the power of God, the wisdom of
God, the prudence and contrivance of God, the goodness and mercy and grace
of God, and the justice of God. It is fit that the divine attributes should have
exercise.... God, as he delights in his own excellency and glorious perfections, so he delights in the exercise of those perfections.''21
The fact that God's glory consists in the demonstration of, for example,
his wrath—an attribute inexpressible without creation—would seem to be a
major problem for Edwards's account of divine aseity. But things are not yet
as bad as they seem. After approvingly citing Edwards's assertion that God's
glory is seen in the communication of all of his attributes, Daniel Fuller suggests that the demonstration of all of his attributes is necessary only given
God's choice to create. He says: "If He [God] did not act in this way [display
his glory], in the world He freely created, He would cease to be God."22 Here
I take it that Fuller's argument is not that God is inherently wrathful, but
that given his choice to create, he must display his glory in the form of all
of his attributes, including his wrath. On this response, God's displaying his
glory was only accidentally necessary given his choice to create, not logically
necessary.
2. Implication 2. The second implication of Edwards's defense is correlated with his assertion that God's glory is shown in creation not because of
a deficiency, but because of an abundance. Granted. God is not lacking. But
why is God's abundance demonstrated to creation? Edwards's answer seems
to be that God is disposed by his nature to overflow. He says: "It is the necessary consequence of his delighting in the glory of his nature, that he delights
in the emanation and effulgence of it."23 But even if it is granted that there
is no deficiency or lack in God, given this stance, it does not follow that God

21

Edwards, "Miscellanies" 553, in Townsend, Philosophy 136.
Daniel Fuller, The Unity of the Bible: Unfolding God's Plan for Humanity (Grand Rapids:
Zondervan, 1992) 448.
23
Edwards, Dissertation I, 4, objection 1, answer 1; Piper, God's Passion 164; italics original.
22
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has no unfulfilled needs. It is possible to be needy either because of a deficiency—a lack that needs to befilled—oran abundance—a surplus that must
be distributed. Either way, there is an unfulfilled need, a need that is met
in the divine creative act. The problem for Edwards is not in defining God's
nature as abundant, but in inferring from God's abundance that his nature
requires a demonstration of his abundance. He says: "It is a regard to himself that disposes him to diffuse and communicate himself. It is such a delight
in his own internal fullness and glory, that disposes him to an abundant effusion and emanation of that glory. The same disposition that causes him to
delight in his glory, causes him to delight in the exhibitions, expressions, and
communications of it."24 God's abundance implies that God must demonstrate
his glory.
Let me summarize my argument. Edwards's task is to reconcile his account
of God's purpose in creating the world with:
(1) Divine aseity and freedom in creation
The implications of his defense are twofold:
(2) God's glory in creation consists in the demonstration of all of his
attributes, including attributes not expressible without creation
(3) God must demonstrate his glory
Edwards's attempt to hold together divine aseity and his account of God's
purpose in creation, therefore, is dependent on the compatibility of (1), (2),
and (3). There is no incompatibility between (1) and (2), because the expression of all of God's attributes might have only been accidentally necessary—
that is, only necessary given his choice to create. Likewise, there is no incompatibility between (1) and (3), because God's glory can be expressed within
the Trinity, completely apart from creation. The incompatibility arises between (1) and the conjunction of (2) and (3), because if God must express his
glory and his glory requires the expression of attributes expressible only in
creation, then it follows that to express his glory—that is, according to Edwards, to be who he is—he must create.
IV. RESPONSES AVAILABLE TO THE CALVINIST

Suppose this is substantially correct—Edwards's understanding of God's
purpose in creation undermines God's aseity.25 But there is no necessity for
all Calviniste to follow Edwards down this rabbit hole. Consequently, it is
24

Edwards, Dissertation, I, 4, objection 2, answer 3; Piper, God's Passion 170.
One possible objection to my argument might be that I have misinterpreted Edwards. While
failures of exegesis are certainly possible, it must be noted that even if I have misread Edwards,
it does not follow that Edwards is not susceptible to an argument like the one I have developed.
Unless Edwards's theological ruminations are understood in a very different manner than is typical, he will remain susceptible to this sort of objection.
25
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certainly possible for the Calvinist to aver that Edwards got on the wrong
track and that his stance must be modified. That is, one might claim that
Edwards's version of Calvinism is problematic not by virtue of his Calvinist
lineage, but by virtue of the metaphysical framework out of which he develops
his theology. A theme in Edwards's writings I have not developed, but with
which I have been dancing around, is his understanding of the God-world relationship. Numerous authors have commentated on Edwards's panentheistic
tendencies.26 Even the analogies Edwards uses—the jewel and the fountain—
are borrowed directly from Plotinus and imply a neo-Platonic, emanationist
metaphysic.
What then are the responses available to the Calvinist? As far as I can see,
there are three general avenues of response. First, one might deny that the
definition of aseity assumed by this argument is a necessary part of Christian
theology. Second, one might modify one of Edwards's theological or philosophical assumptions. Third, one might acknowledge that there is a tension
between aseity and the typical Calvinist understanding of God's purpose in
creation, but respond by arguing that this is a problem for all theological positions, not just Calvinism. I will deal briefly with each of these responses.
The version of divine aseity under consideration by my argument ispsychological aseity. There is nothing in Edwards's writings (so far as I can tell)
that undercuts God's ontological aseity. Therefore, one avenue of response for
the Calvinist is to argue that while ontological aseity is a property essential
to God's nature, psychological aseity is not. This perspective might assert that
God is, by nature, a creator and being self-satisfied requires the exercise of
that capacity. This response, however, does not so much evade the objection
as it ignores it and denies that it identifies an actual problem for Calvinism.
The problem is that there is strong consensus within the orthodox Christian
tradition that psychological aseity is indeed part of God's nature. So while this
is a possible response, it is not likely to be warmly embraced by the Calvinist.
A second response involves modifying one of the aspects of Edwards's
theology. The incompatibility between (1) and the conjunction of (2) and (3)
can be removed by abandoning or adequately revising either (2) or (3). Suppose (3) is chosen. Here there are a range of options, the first of which is the
following:
(3a) God must demonstrate his glory in creation.
This modification removes the incompatibility between (1) and the conjunction
of (2) and (3) by making even the expression of God's glory contingent on his
choice to create. He did not have to display his glory, but given his choice to
create, he must do so. While this maneuver is logically possible, it is not
clear that it is an epistemic possibility for the Calvinist. Epistemic possibility
is more restrictive than logical possibility. While propositions such as "My
26
Charles Hodge, for example, viewed Edwards's doctrine of continuous creation as entailing
pantheism. See his Systematic Theology (3 vols.; New York: Scribners' Sons, 1872) 1.577 and
2.217ff.; cf. Gerstner, The Theology of Jonathan Edwards 12 n. 45.
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computer has a mass greater than the sun" and "China has a population of
four" are logically possible, they are not epistemically possible—that is, they
are not possible given what is commonly known or accepted. The question
that must be asked is, Why is God such that he must demonstrate his glory
in creation! The key word here is must. If God must demonstrate his glory,
ultimately, the choice must be grounded by an aspect of God's nature; his
choice must reflect who he is. Consequently, while God's choice was free in
that it was self-determined—it was neither indeterminate nor externally determined—for divine aseity to be maintained, self-determination is necessary,
but not sufficient. Divine aseity requires that God's decision to create the
world be free in a libertarian27 sense of the word—God possessed power to
the contrary in his choice. While he was not and could never be "disinterested" in his decision, there was nothing—either external to him or part of
his internal nature—that necessitated one choice or made another impossible.
Divine aseity, therefore, requires not only that God's choice be free—that
is, self-determined—but that it not be internally necessitated. For if it was
internally necessitated, then God's nature would be such that he needed to
create the world to be who he was. By implication, while God has the capacity to create, being a creator is neither one of his essential properties nor is
it entailed by any of his essential properties (either singly or in conjunction).
If (3a) is not an option, how about:
(3b) God will demonstrate his glory.
Unfortunately for the Calvinist, weakening (3) in this way does not sidestep
the objection under consideration because the conjunction (2) and (3b) is still
incompatible with (1). If God will express his glory and God's glory requires
the expression of attributes expressible only in creation, then it follows that
God must create the world; creation was not an option. So even if the modal
qualifier in (3) is weakened significantly, problems remain. In fact, given the
acceptance of (2), demonstration of God's glory must be defined as merely
possible to evade the objection, for example:
(3c) God can demonstrate his glory.
However, (3c) is so uncontroversial and such a weak statement of God's sovereignty that it is highly unlikely to be embraced by the Calvinist.
The lesson to be learned is that the more problematic proposition is (2).
Suppose then that the Calvinist chooses to evade the objection under consideration by rejecting (2)—that is, the Calvinist abandons Edwards's assertion that God's glory includes the expression of attributes expressible only
27
A caveat: "libertarian freedom" is not a term I relish. By usage and implication it is too tied
to an Enlightenment notion of an autonomous moral agent, basing choices solely on the deliverances of reason, having a nature that originated as tabula rasa. Not only is this nothing like an
accurate description of the human decision-making process, I submit that it cannot be anything
like an accurate description of God's decision to create the world.
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in creation. Of course, God could still express his glory by expressing his
attributes; if God's glory is understood in terms of the expression of attributes already given full expression within the Trinity, there is no problem
in saying that God creates with the purpose of displaying his glory. While
abandoning (2) would, in fact, evade my objection, it is not an avenue likely
be attractive to many Calvinists because (2) is often thought to be central
to the Calvinist explanation and defense of unconditional damnation and
election.
So it seems this objection will not be easily sidestepped. But there is one
final possibility. One might acknowledge that there is an incompatibility between aseity and the typical Calvinist understanding of God's purpose in
creation, but respond by, in effect, throwing mud on the entire issue. In this
respect, it might be argued that there is either no need to answer the question:
"Why did God create?" or that answering this question is fundamentally beyond our ken. Edwards lands in the trouble he does because he was willing
to speculate about God's purpose in creation. With no such speculation, the
objection is a non-starter. Martin Luther, for example, would have probably
embraced this option. In response to the question, "What was God doing before he created the world?" Luther reportedly answered: "Cutting switches
to punish those who answer impertinent questions." Perhaps Calvin would
also have chosen this option since he once said that before creation God was
"building hell for the curious."28
There is ample rationale for remaining agnostic with respect to God's
purpose in creation in the inscrutability of God's will or the noetic finitude
of humanity (or a combination of both). A rationale for agnosticism that I do
not find convincing, however, is that no theological position, including Arminianism, has a satisfactory answer to the objection under consideration.29 I
believe that there is an adequate Arminian answer to this objection.
The Arminian understanding of the purpose of creation is, not surprisingly,
markedly different from the Calvinist's. While the Calvinist makes God's glory
the chief end in creation, the Arminian calls attention to God's love. While
there are many ways to express this basic idea, I like Greg Boyd's description of God's chief end in creation—to bring about the Trinification of reality
by replicating divine love throughout creation. While the Arminian must
acknowledge that there is some sense in which God receives something from
creation and that God deems the reception of that thing to be intrinsically
good, I will argue that this fact does not compromise an unflinching acceptance of divine aseity.
Recall that what created problems for Edwards was the incompatibility
between (1) and the conjunction of (2) and (3). The Arminian both rejects
28
The Institutes of the Christian Religion I, xiv, 1 (ed. John T. McNeill; trans. Ford Lewis Battles, Philadelphia: Westminster. 1960) 160.
29
This objection is raised forcefully by Jonathan Edwards: "If any are not satisfied with the preceding answer [his account of God's purpose in creation], but still insist on the objection [that it
makes God dependent on creation], let them consider whether they can devise any other scheme
of God's last end in creating the world, but what will be equally obnoxious to this objection in its
full force, if there be any force in it" (Dissertation, I, 4, objection 1, answer 2).
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(2)—the assertion that God's glory in creation consists in the demonstration
of all of his attributes, including attributes not expressible without creation—
and modifies (3)—by asserting that God's glory is found in the expression of
his love. Since love is an attribute that is not expressible only in creation,
and in fact, finds its fullest expression within the divine being, there is no
sense in which God must create to be who he is. 30 Therefore, the Arminian
is not committed to (2) and (3) but to:
(A2) God's love in creation is seen in the creation of human freedom
(A3) God is such that he must demonstrate his love.
Of course, an Arminian might choose to remain agnostic about God's purpose in creation. My point is that it is not necessary to do so to maintain divine aseity.
But does this suggest that the Arminian abandons the idea of the glory
of God? Certainly not! It would be an egregious (and indeed heretical) mistake to ignore God's glory. My argument, however, is that God's glory is most
properly seen in his love. The nature of God's glory—as seen in the demonstration of all of God's attributes—is such that it cannot be the sole and ultimate purpose for creation. To do so would be to compromise God's aseity.
Rather, it is in affirming that creation is a gift of God's love—unmerited and
unnecessitated—that the glory of God finds its fullest expression.
V. CONCLUSION

In Edwards's A Dissertation Concerning the End for Which God Created
the World we find what is perhaps the most comprehensive account of God's
sovereignty in creation. Even for one who disagrees with Edwards's theological position, there is much with which to be impressed. Nevertheless I have
argued that his position is problematic in that it implies the denial of divine
aseity. It has been said that it is dangerous to pay God too many metaphysical compliments. The lesson learned from Edwards is that, perhaps, it is dangerous to pay God too many theological compliments as well.

30
Perhaps this is why Grudem defends God's freedom by referring to God's love, not his glory:
"Since there was perfect love and fellowship among the members of the Trinity from all eternity
(John 17:5, 24) God did not create us because he was lonely or because he needed fellowship with
other persons" (Systematic Theology 440). This is, of course, true, but it is not the sort of defense
one would expectfroma Calvinist such as Grudem, and certainly not in a paragraph entitled: "God
Did Not Need To Create Man, Yet He Created Us for His Own Glory."

